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Abstract. Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-
types are the “cognitive primitives” that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented 
within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and 
goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory 
of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.  
In defending his stimulating proposal, Pietraszewski does not focus on the role that theory of 
mind (or “mindreading”) plays in guiding applications of the folk concept GROUP. Importantly, 
though, there are good reasons for thinking that attributions of shared intentionality have a 
central role to play.   
There is an ongoing debate as to what exactly shared intentionality involves. At a minimum, it 
requires more than the just the possession of common goals and intentions. For example, people 
simultaneously jogging along a trail may have the same goal of getting fit, but they are not 
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engaging in shared intentionality unless they each harbor an intention of the form, “I intend that 
we jog together” (see Bratman, 1999, chapter 8; Tomasello et al., 2005).      
There is direct evidence that shared intentionality drives costly decisions to help ingroup 
members over outgroup members (McClung et al., 2017). There is also evidence that 
applications of the folk concept GROUP are guided by attributions of shared intentionality. A 
number of studies have found that entitativity perception—the tendency to regard some 
aggregates of people as more “groupish” than others—is mediated by judgments concerning 
shared intentionality (for some recent discussions, see Phillips, 2021a, 2021b). For example, 
people’s impression that an aggregate of individuals constitutes a genuine group is enhanced 
when they observe these individuals moving in synchrony (Ip et al., 2006; Lakens & Stel, 2011; 
Wilson & Gos, 2019). Importantly, these studies suggest that people only tend to regard 
synchronous movement as a cue for groupishness when they see it as resulting from shared 
intentionality.   
Research into entitativity perception therefore suggests that the folk encode shared intentions and 
goals as central to the concept GROUP; whereas, they encode certain visible cues, such as 
synchronous movement, as relatively peripheral (or “ancillary” to use Pietraszewski’s term). 
There are various models of conceptual centrality. The core insight is that a feature, F, is more 
central to a given concept than feature, G, if G is represented as depending on F more than F 
depends on G (see Sloman et al., 1998). Thus, the mediational effects outlined above suggest that 
the folk encode shared intentions and goals as more central to GROUP than synchronous 
movements, because they represent the latter as causally depending on the former, but not vice 
versa.  
Pietraszewski notes that detecting group-based intentions helps us to predict whether an agent 
will participate in one of the triadic interactions with certain others (note 10, p. 48). Arguably, 
though, just as the folk encode shared intentions as more central to GROUP than coordinated 
movements, they also encode shared intentions as more central than the triadic interaction-types 
identified by Pietraszewski. In contexts of conflict and cooperation, agents participate in these 
sorts of interactions precisely because they share certain intentions and goals with fellow group 
members. For example, when Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, Britain’s declaration of war 
was predictable, in part, because Britain and Belgium shared a suite of goals and intentions (all 
enshrined in a treaty). By the same token, consider a case in which we are not willing to 
categorize an aggregate as a genuine group. In Pietraszewski’s example, some people are waiting 
for a bus when a motorist throws a stone at one of them. Suppose each person at the bus stop 
simultaneously hurls a stone back at the driver. The studies outlined above suggest that the folk 
will not categorize this aggregate of people as a genuine group unless they see them as sharing 
an intention of the form, “I intend that we attack the driver together.”    
If what I am suggesting is right, this puts pressure on Pietraszewski’s claim that representations 
of triadic interaction-types are the “cognitive primitives” that constitute the folk concept of a 
group-in-conflict. A number of studies have found that when one feature is encoded as more 
central to a given concept than another feature, the former is a stronger determinant of 
categorization decisions (e.g., see Ahn et al., 2000). Thus, according to the alternative hypothesis 
on offer, applications of GROUP—in contexts of both cooperation and conflict—are guided by 
representations of certain triadic interactions, but only insofar as these interactions serve as cues 
for shared intentionality. This suggests that the task of constructing a computational theory of 
group cognition is more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages, for it will require no less than a 
computational theory of mindreading. To put it another way, suppose we were to build 
Pietraszewski’s robot, which can navigate the social world by deploying representations of 
groups. If our robot cannot attribute shared intentionality to others, it will be left in the dust by its 
(socially adept) human counterparts.     
To conclude, it is worth noting that a full-blown capacity for shared intentionality takes time to 
develop in humans (Tomasello et al., 2005)—presumably, the capacity to attribute shared 
intentionality takes considerably longer. Nonetheless, there is evidence that infants can track 
some of the interaction-types identified by Pietraszewski (e.g., see Ting et al., 2019). Similarly, 
the capacity for shared intentionality appears to be largely absent in nonhuman primates 
(Tomasello et al., 2005). Regardless, some nonhuman primates, such as baboons, are able to 
track groups as they fluctuate across episodes of conflict (e.g., see Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). It 
is possible that young children, as well as some nonhuman primates, track groups-in-conflict by 
detecting triadic interactions of the sort identified by Pietraszewski. If so, Pietraszewski’s 
account may describe an early-developing, phylogenetically ancient, system for detecting 
groups-in-conflict. This system may output a relatively “thin” concept of groups the possession 
of which does not require an understanding of shared intentionality. Instead, possessing the thin 
concept might only require an agent to detect triadic interactions by utilizing low-level 
perceptual cues (e.g. visible instances of hitting, chasing, etc.). In contrast, the “thick” concept of 
a group that adults deploy in central cognition appears to encode shared intentions as central, and 
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